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AUSTRALIAN ENERGY POLICY AND ITS LIKELY IMPACT
ON RURAL INDUSTRY COSTS & PROFITABILITY
Synopsis:
During the past three years petrol pricing arrangements in 
Australia have undergone several major changes. In particular, 
the 1977-78 Budget introduced a new set of crude oil pricing 
arrangements which were to have wide ranging ramifications over 
the next decade- for all consumers. These pricing arrangements 
were amended in the 1978-79 Budget to encompass a policy of moving 
Australia’s oil prices to world market prices immediately.
The impact of these petroleum price increases on the rural sector 
in aggregate is estimated, for example, at approximately $36 
million in the 1977-78 period and $69 million in the 1978-79 
period. This represents an average across the board increase of 
1.2 and 1.6 per cent per annum respectively, in total cash costs 
per farm.
The assessments given in this paper are tentative and assume a 
number of factors which may well change. It is therefore 
important to realise the assumptions behind some of these 
qualitative statements. These are: (i) price elasticity of 
demand for petroleum products is more inelastic in agriculture 
than other sectors, (ii) rural sector's petroleum intensity 
remains unchanged? (iii) agricultural producers lack the ability
to pass on cost increases; (iv) there is no change in the 
marketing or distribution of close substitutes to petroleum or 
rapid change in farm technology.
Given changes in any one or more of these explicit assumptions the 
need for ad3ustroent/ m  the rural sector to post—OPEC energy 
prices may be negated.
I. Introduction
The essential role of energy, in particular hydrocarbon based 
sources in the functioning of an industrialised country has been 
illustrated by reaction to price increases in oil in recent 
years. In Australia in 1977 fossil fuels accounted for over 80 
per cent of total energy demand of which 60 per cent was supplied 
by liquid hydro carbons.(1)
The dependence of Western societies on energy has been appreciated 
by Governments implicitly if not explicity, especially in times of 
supply interruptions such as the Suez incident of 1956. However 
it took the upheavals of 1973-74 and the growing concern with 
resource scarcity around the world to focus public attention on 
the importance of energy in our society.
It is common knowledge that Australia was largely insulated from 
the supply and price disruptions stemming from the OPEC actions of 
late 1973. This was due to Australia's large indigenous crude oil 
supply, available from 1970 onwards, and our self sufficiency in 
other energy resources such as coal. While Australia has an 
abundance of these energy resources it is not entirely self 
sufficient in crude oil.
In an attempt to encourage further activity in oil production and 
exploration and to facilitate a more efficient use of resources in 
a post-OPEC energy world, Australian Governments have decided in 
recent years to increase the price of domestically produced crude 
oil to the equivalent of world prices (i.e. 'import parity'). (2)
Rural producers have been worried to the extent that the rural 
lobby(3) has sought exemptions from the impost of this pricing 
policy either by direct subsidy and/or by pricing discrimination 
in favour of rural consumers. Groups such as the Victorian 
Farmers Union have argued that agriculturalists should receive 
special consideration allowing them to partially avoid the 
petroleum price increases. The rationale for their request 
includes such points as:
(*•) agriculture is a net producer of energy and therefore 
deserves encouragement
(ii) the industry is decentralised and cannot readily reduce 
its dependence on petroleum products.
Agricultural producers also asserted that further cost increases 
would worsen their financial position. For the sixty per cent of 
agricultural output that is sold on export markets, they may be 
unable to pass on increases in local costs. Domestically, while a 
proportion of the costs may be passed forward, the price 
elasticity of demand for the majority of their products decreases 
this option. It has also been asserted that increased fuel costs 
will be particularly detrimental to rural relative to other 
industries, further lessening the sector's ability to maintain its 
relative output and employment. While there may be no a priori 
reason for the sector to remain at any given relative size, again 
farmers argued that their existence does have a beneficial 
influence on society in economic and social terms.
Aims of This Paper:
This paper is to review the implications of Australia's energy 
policy for the rural sector. To this end, the following areas are 
examined.
(a) a brief description of the past and current energy policy 
and their underlying rationale?
(b) an appraisal of the likely increases in petroleum prices 
flowing from the current policy and the subsequent impact 
this will have on average farm costs for a number of rural 
activities;
(c) the potential impact of these changes on Australian users, 
particularly agricultural industries, is discussed, 
following which estimates of the aggregate additional 
costs likely to be incurred by the rural sector are put 
forward;
(d) the paper is concluded with a discussion of the estimated 
effects of the recently re-introduced freight 
subsidisation scheme.
Part of the work here follows on from that done earlier by 
Partridge (1978)(4) but is more extensive. That article made an 
assessment of the costs associated with the Indigenous Crude Oil 
(ICO) Policy (announced in the 1977-78 Budget), on the Wheat and
Grazing industries for the year 1977-78. ior example the 
additional cost burden of these changes was estimated in aggregate 
for the Wheat and the Australian Grazing Industries (AGIS)(5) at 
approximately 29 million dollars.
II. Background
World energy prices have been rising, firstly at a steady rate 
over the 1970-73 period and then.more rapidly from 1973-74 to 
1975-76. Prom 1975-76 they have maintained their * real* price in 
U.S. dollar terms.(6)
The period since 1971 has been associated with an increasing 
marginal cost for crude oil because of the limitations (political 
or otherwise) placed on supply from existing OPEC production and 
the increasing cost of discovery and production of oil from new 
fields such as the North Sea and Alaska, etc.
In the absence of major technological change or advances it is 
unlikely that the price of oil will decline, in real terms, over 
the rest of this century.(7)
Prior to the 1970s Australian supplies of crude oil have been 
totally dependent on imports. In the 1960s there had been some 
minor discoveries made and developed but these(8) fields never met 
more than ten per cent of local requirements. The output of these 
developments was priced at above the then existing world parity
price/ partly as an incentive to further exploration and with the 
rationale that these minor discoveries offered some respite to the 
re-occurring balance of payment problems of the 1960s. The major 
impetus to indigenous production came with the development of the 
offshore Gippsland fields in Bass Strait. Although the Gippsland 
fields contributed over 70 per cent of local demand over the 
1970-77 period their contribution is expected to decline, so that 
in 1985-86 they are expected to supply only 45-50 per cent of 
local liquid hydro carbon demand.(9)
Table 1




1967-68 11 8 145 92 156 27 73 — — 100
1970-71 93 49 97 51 190 1 18 - 81 100
1974-75 145 65 77 35 222 1 9 - 90 100
1975-76 149 64 83 36 232 1 8 - 92 100
1976-77 154 63 90 37 244 1 8 - 92 100
1977-78 159 62 97 38 256 1 7 - ’ 93 100
1978-79 155 58 110 42 265 1 7 - 93 100
1979-80 155 56 123 44 278 1 6 - 93 100
1980-81 152 53 135 47 287 1 6 — 93 100
(1) Million Barrels per annum. (2) Australian Production refers to stabilised areas production whereas
'Final demand' figures refer to imports of refined and crude stocks; figures 1975-76 onwards refer to 
stabilised crude percentages only.
Imports
Relative Production of Australian 










Royal Commission on Petroleum, 5th Report, AGPS, Canberra 1976, p. 339. 
Esso Australia Ltd., 'Australian Energy Outlook1 (1978).
Dept, of National Development (publications various).
Australian Institute of Petroleum Ltd., 'Oil and Australia' (1977).
HI* Past government policy 
on indigenous crude oil
(a) 1965 Policy Statement
While there had been substantial oil exploration activity in 
Australia, apart from a minor show at Rough Range in 1953, little 
success was achieved. It was not until 1961, when discoveries 
were made in the Bowen—Surat basin in Queensland, commonly known 
as the Moonie fields, that any commercial developments were 
commenced.
The failure of the developer of this gas and oil field and the 
major buyer to come to agreement by the time production was due to 
commence, brought the Federal Government into the field of oil 
pricing in Australia.
In 1963 when the production facilities at Moonie and the pipeline 
from Moonie to Brisbane was nearing completion, negotiations 
between the producer and,refineries were becoming stalled and 
potentially threatened the commencement of production. Both 
parties were in agreement that ’import parity* equivalent should 
be the basis of the pricing arrangements. Differences arose over 
what the import parity price for this new Australian crude should 
be, e.g. the level of freight costs, wharfage, exchange rates and 
premium for quality, should be taken into calculation. Refineries 
had a variety of foreign crudes of varying quality being imported 
at the time but there were no crudes imported of a comparable
quality and composition to the low-sulphur, light crude available 
from Moonie.
As the two parties were appeared to be bogged down, the Department 
of National Development brought the two parties together and acted 
as arbitrator in the discussions. The Department’s main function 
was to ascertain what constituted the average import parity price 
for crude oil in Australia, and what quality differential Moonie 
crude might attract in the world market. They finally settled on 
US$2.83 per barrel, a price which was to run for 15 months; a 
further discount of US30 cents per/barrel was deducted until a 
refinery commenced operation in Brisbane. The cost in 1961 of 
'Arabian Light*, the 'marker' crude, was US$1.80 f.o.b. Persian 
Gulf.
On 11 November 1964 the Minister for Trade and Industry, Mr. J. 
McEwan referred the question of pricing of indigenous crude to the 
Tariff Board. Questions specifically referred to in the brief 
were:
(a) the basis for valuation of indigenous crude oil
(b) what measures and level of protection the industry should 
be afforded .
(c) how (b) should be implemented e.g. excise duties, direct 
subsidy, By-law etc.
(d) Measures to ensure the provision of an Australian market 
for all indigenous production.
Hunter(10) has pointed out that the oil industry already enjoyed a 
30-40 per cent subsidy (non-taxable) on survey and exploration 
work and the full expensing of exploration against future income. 
While these measures were specifically aimed at the exploration 
section of the industry, given the vertical intergration and 
corporate structure of the industry it was difficult to see how 
these subsidies did not flow through to finance other sections of 
the production chain.
With regard to point (d), the government felt the need to ensure 
that local crude would be utilised in Australia. This was not a 
foregone conclusion of the discovery of oil locally. The Moonie 
fields were quite small, capable of meeting only less than 3 per 
cent of domestic demand and its chemical structure and yield was 
considerably different from those crudes imported at the time.
The latter two points meant that refineries would be involved in 
considerable expenditure to alter existing refining plant to 
accommodate the Moonie crude. Also the local refiners were all 
off-shoots of international oil companies. These companies then 
found it more advantageous to draw down crude from their Middle 
East sources than to take small quantities from local 
sources.(11) The main recommendations of the Tariff Board in 1965 
were (hat the price basis should be:
1. The weighted average of f.o.b. 'posted' prices as at 1
April 1965 of the principal crudes imported into Australia 
during calendar 1964,
US $1.82
weighted average freight rates 
on crude imported in 1964; based 
on AFRA rates for medium tankers
US $0.56
Wharfage and landing charges US $0.10
Quality differential for Moonie 
crude . US $0.27
Exploration incentive to local 
producers
Total Price f.o.b Brisbane 
(per barrel)
The Tariff Board also recommended, in line with the Minister's 
guidelines, that Australian crude should be processed by 
Australian refineries. This was to be achieved by the imposition 
of excise duties on imports by oil companies that failed to take 
up their full allocation of indigenous crude. These penalties 








The board was recommending assistance to the exploration industry 
via an administered price scheme, which was greater than the 
market price. Their reasoning for this method of support was that 
Moonie1s contribution to domestic oil consumption was very low and 
therefore the higher price should not affect consumer (retail) 
prices. This was not the case however as oil companies were 
granted increases by the South Australian Prices Commissioner on 
the grounds of costs stemming from these decisions.
The Government accepted the formula recommended by the Board but 
increased the ‘incentive* component to US75 cents.(13) The price 
for Moonie was set at US$3.50 or A$3.13 for a 5 year period i.e.
17 Sept. 1965 to 17 Sept. 1970.
At this time (1966) the commercial significance of Barrow Island, 
W.A. was recognised and its price was set on a similar formula, 
though with a higher quality differential i.e. A$3.24 per barrel 
f.o.b., Fremantle.. Again this was not expected to have any impact 
on retail prices as in 1967-68 Moonie and Barrow Is. combined met 
less than 8 per cent of Australia’s demand.
The pricing formula used by the Tariff Board has since been 
criticised(14) for reasons other than the allocative and 
administrative problems that a support price might induce. The 
base of the formula revolved around the weighted average price of 
crude oils imported into Australia in 1964; this was estimated at 
US$1.82. However the Board took no account of the discounts on 
'posted* prices normally operating between overseas suppliers and
locally affiliated refineries in Austral^. r While evidence was 
presented at the hearing on the level of discounts available to 
refineries and Australian taxation authorities certainly made 
allowances for this transfer pricing.in the calculation of tax 
liability of the refineries, the Board declined to include a 
discount factor in their formula. The reason proffered was the 
level of discounts were volatile and in making a recommendation 
for a 5 year period it would be better to omit this factor.
In evidence, the level of discounts available to Australian oil 
refineries was estimated at approximately 19 cents per barrel, and 
this figure subsequently increased until 1970. The level of 
protection afforded by the formula was considerably greater than 
the US75 cents per barrel incentive margin would infer. Also 
there was some dispute over the Board*s valuation of the quality 
differential. Some parties placed its value well below the 27 
cents adopted in the formula, the concensus was closer to 21 
cents. Therefore the level of protection was closer to US$1.00 
per barrel or the equivalent of 43 per cent ad valorem tariff.
The additional cost of this formula to consumers was not 
restricted to the higher support price. The policy of compulsory 
purchase of indigenous crude presented refiners with an additional 
cost which would not have been incurred if they used only imported 
crudes. As stated above, the Australian crudes represented only a 
fraction of the refining industry's total throughput and there 
was, consequently, little resistance from the Industry.
Concurrent to the commencement of the compulsory Oil Absorption 
Policy, the government further stated that indigenous crude should 
be carried around the coast in Australian flag bottoms. Given the 
higher cost structure of this mode of transport, in comparison to 
overseas registered bottoms, this imposed a further cost, which 
was on passed to Australian petroleum consumers.
(b) 1968 Policy Statement
In 1965 the Esso-BHP consortium discovered commercial quantities 
of gas in the Barracouta field off the Victorian coast. By late 
1966 substantial oil discoveries had been made in other areas of 
Gippsland. It was soon appreciated that if the pricing criteria 
set out by the Tariff Board was applied to Gippsland crude, it 
would have a large impact on petroleum prices and the general 
price level. It was anticipated in 1968 that Gippsland would be 
supplying up to 70% of domestic crude requirements by 1972 and in 
those halcyon days it was even estimated that Bass Strait might 
eventually supply up to 95% of all domestic requirements.
Following direct negotiations between the Prime Minister (Right 
Hon. J.G. Gorton) and the main oil producers a new policy was 
announced which again changed, ostensibly, the direction and 
emphasis of crude oil pricing in Australia. On the 10 October 
1968 a statement was made to Parliament(15) reinterating the 
Governments desire to see the Oil Absorption Policy continue for 
a further ten years period from 18 September 1970. This, Mr. 
Gorton asserted, would ensure access in the domestic market for 
all indigenous crude.
Secondly, the government announced as policy that for the five 
year period after 17 September 1970, indigenous crude prices would 
be set in relation to world parity equivalent. This was defined 
as the posted price of a ’marker* crude (Arabian Light) as at 10 
Oct. 1968, less the discounts allowed at the time, plus an 
allowance for overseas freight (based on large bottom rates) and 
wharfage. Included in this price was to be an allowance for a 
quality premium for each type of crude.
For the intervening period i.e. October 1968 to September 1970 
Gippsland crude price was set by the old Tariff Board formula, 
however the incentives component was omitted, i.e. A$2.42y A$3.14
less 67 cents incentive allowance plus a further ’introductory* 
rebate of 5 cents.
The method of pricing local crude applicable from 17 Sept 1970, 
can be summarised as follows:
Aust. $
1. Weighted average ’posted* price
as at 10.10.68 1.62
2. less weighted average discounts
applicable as at 10.10.68 0.26
1.36
3. plus' weighted average
freight (AFRA Large) 0.46
4. Wharfage 0.07
1.89
5. Plus quality differentials of:
26-30 cents for Gippsland $2.02
34 cents Barrow Island $2.23
26 cents for Moonie crude $2.15
(N.B.: Prices were f.o.b. nearest refinery part)
While the government had moved to the adoption of an import parity 
pricing their motivation was not so much with ensuring optimal 
resource allocation. Their concern was with the inflationary 
aspects of maintaining a high support price, now that Gippsland 
crude had the potential to supply a majority of the domestic 
.market. (16)
The exclusion of the incentive allowance from the pricing criteria 
also meant a change in the method of financing assistance to 
domestic exploration industry. Taxation concessions and direct 
subsidies tended to replaced the support price mechanism as a 
means of transferring aid to the industry. The inclusion of 
discounts off the ’posted1 price was another major departure from 
the 1965 Tariff Board pricing structure.
While it appeared that the government was new removing any 
semblance of incentive from the price structure, the arrangements 
were not without fault. Firstly the price was fixed to run for 
five years up to 1975 i.e. there were no price variation clauses 
in the agreements. This omission later led to a great deal of 
friction between governments, producers and marketers in the mid 
seventies. The reason, it appears, that no price variation clause 
existed was due to the medium to long run price expectations the 
government then held about the price of crude oil in world markets.
It was not only the Federal Government but the world oil industry 
held the expectations, at the time, that the world market price of 
oil was on a downward slide. There was no reason for industry 
analystist to presume otherwise. The 'posted' price, the price 
used by the oil producing countries to levy royalties, had 
remained relatively constant in money terms (i.e. approx.
US$1.80), but the level of discounts had generally grown during 
the sixties. Reserves had been growing at a faster rate than 
> consumption and several new areas were anticipated to come on 
stream by the late sixties. Thus, while import parity was the 
stated target, the Government's expectations must have been that 
import parity i.e. real world oil prices would drop. The price 
fixed for indigenous crude in 1968 would, by 1970, be the 
equivalent of a support price if the industry's expectations were 
fulfilled, i.e. above the world market rate.
As events unfolded, quite the reverse occurred. The Federal 
Government in 1968 had effectively fixed the price producers
received at below world parity returns. It appears that events 
such as the closure of Suez during the Six Days War and the price 
effects on world markets of the production disruptions in the late 
sixties provided the fledgling. Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporters (OPEC)(17) with the demonstration of their potential 
collective power. World oil prices had however actually started 
to increase prior to the commencement of the 1970-75 policy 
period. Firstly manifestering itself via a reduction in discounts 
and after the Tehran Agreement in 1971, actual ’posted* prices 
started to rise at a substantial rate(18) (though less than the 
increases experienced in 1973-74). Presumably the government had 
the option of amending the pricing arrangements prior to its 
commencement. However it*s not unreasonable to assert that the 
government * s omission to act was directly related to the concern 
expressed about the inflationary pressures building up in the 
economy in 1970-71.
Throughout 1971 and 1972 the price of crude oil on the world 
market increased. The rate of increase was lifted dramatically 
from the time of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 through to 
early 1974. The disparity between the world price and Australian 
price can be seen on Diagram 1; import parity was four times 
greater than Australian crude by 1 January 1974.
This disparity between indigenous crude and import parity had a 
number of repercussions for producers, refiners and consumers.
Exploration groups (e.g. Australian Petroleum Exploration 
Association) lobbied that sub parity prices would stifle oil 
search in Australia and pressed for the adoption of a policy of 
self sufficiency based on world parity prices. Marketers, who had 
reluctantly accepted the compulsory oil absorption policy, now 
sought ways to maximise, rather than minimise their allocation of 
the lower priced indigenous crude. As a result of the allocation 
system this caused considerable distortion in the pattern of 
demand for petroleum products which attracted a higher indigenous 
crude oil allocation for the marketing oil company. International 
bunkering and aviation fuel sales rose dramatically, and there was 
a considerable incentive for companies to sell the normally higher 
priced distillates to fuel oil customers to increase the 
allocation quotas.(19) Other sources of distortions caused by the 
absorption policy were outlined by various company representatives 
at the 1976 XAC hearing.
(c) 1975 Policy Statement
By the end of the 1970-75 arrangements, the disparity between 
import parity and indigenous prices was nearly five-fold. The 
Federal Labor Government however opted for a change in pricing 
criteria away from the concept of world parity which meant little 
movement in the returns to current producers.
The policy was split into two sections. For new discoveries, oil 
producers would receive import parity, less a production levy of 
$2 per barrel. Oil developments operating prior to September 1975
i.e. 'old' oil, was to be priced at level for each field depending 
on the economic and technical considerations applying to that 
field, on a type of ‘cost plus* basis. The Prime Minister offered 
the following comment at the time •
*(He) said the new policy had a two fold objective. The 
Government wished to provide the maximum incentive for 
exploration of new oil fields and at the same time wanted 
to give existing producers from known discoveries a fair 
return on their investment which would ensure that all 
economically recoverable oil is produced from known 
fields*.(20)
The following price increases over the 1970-75 prices were granted:
Gippsland - an increase of 23 cents per barrel, in order to enable 
producers to recover over a ten year period the cost of 
developing two new developments, Mackerel and Tuna. This 
price was also to allow ESSO-BHP a fair return on overall 
funds. The rate of return was not publicly stated however in 
evidence at the later IAC hearing ESSO stated their rate of 
return, on a discounted cash flow basis, over that period, was 
approx. 11 per cent. The new Gippsland price of $2.33 was to 
be valid for the 3 years to Sept. 1978. The question of 
pricing for Gippsland and all other indigenous crudes was then 
to be referred to the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC)
for review.
Barrow Island - annual increases were related to the anticipated 
expenditure required to apply secondary recovery techniques. 
Prices were set at 17 September 1975 to 17 September 1976 at 
$2.75
1976 to 77 at $2.88
1977 to 78 at $3.17 per barrel
Moonie — price increases were based on cost of secondary and 
tertiary
recovery needed to maintain this marginal and declining 




There was provision in the agreements with the oil companies that 
any production, from 'old' oil developments, which involved 
additional (and/or unanticipated) capital investment would be 
grounds for negotiation of a price increase, over and above those 
applying until September 1978.
Prior to this policy announcement the government in the 1975-76 
Budget had imposed a production levy of $2 per barrel on oil 
producers, which was, subsequently passed forward to consumers.
The weighted average cost of indigenous crude oil in October 1975 
was approximately $4.37 (see Table 2), this represented a 
113 per cent increase over the July 1975 price. On the election 
of the Liberal-NCP government in December 1975 it was evident that 
these arrangements would be reviewed at an early date.
(d) 1977 Policy Statement
On 23 April 1976 the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. J.D. Anthony 
announced the XAC would be requested-to investigate and report on 
the price and absorption policy for indigenous crude oil up until 
September 1980. The newly elected Government stated that they had 
received a number of representations from oil producer and 
exploration bodies. These groups expressed some confusion over 
the pricing applicable to fields discovered before Sept. 1975 but 
not yet in production. Furthermore, it was asserted that a 
considerable quantity of oil was potentially available from ’old' 
areas but not at the current sub-parity price.
The reference had been foreshadowed by Mr Anthony when in 
Opposition, and this was alluded to in the press releases 
announcing the enquiry. Prior to December 1975, it had been the 
Liberal NCP policy that indigenous crude oil should be priced at 
world parity, though no specific mention was made to the problem 
of 'windfall gains' and related taxation issues.
The IAC presented their report on 30 September 1976(21) and made 
the following recommendations:
'The Commission recommends that the price paid to producers of 
indigenous crude oil produced during the period ending 17 
September 1980 from fields discovered before 14 September 1975
should be:
developed for production (i.e. including the Mackerel and 
Tuna fields) a price (excluding the Government levy of 
$2.00 per barrel) of:
1. ’From Gippsland fields currently producing or being
Until 31 December 1976 $2.33 per barrel
From 1 January 1977 ' 27 per cent)
From 1 January 1978
)
33 per cent)
From 1 January 1979
From 1 January 1980 
to 17 September 1980
)




2. ’From the Barrow Island and Moonie fields $2.88 and $4.35 
per barrel respectively (excluding the Government levy of 
$2.00 per barrel) until 31 December 1976 and thereafter at 
import parity less the Government levy of $2.00 per barrel;
3. ’From fields not yet in production (excluding the
Gippsland fields of Mackerel and Tuna) and from expansions 
and extensions of presently producing fields which would 
require installation of substantial new facilities to 
recover the oil, import parity less the Government levy of 
$2.00 per barrel.
’The Commission also recommends that import parity for crude oil 
pricing purposes be assessed as the weighted average landed cost
in Australia of Light Arabian crude oil, carried in LRI tankers, 
at the Customs port at the refining centre nearest to the 
producing field and should include allowance for the quality of 
indigenous oil, calculated using the modified Nelson method, 
subject to revision where necessary.
The Commission draws attention to its comments in respect of the 
following matters:
• credit terms allowed by oil producers (Section 6.1.1);
. the treatment of condensate (Section 6.1.3); and 
. royalty arrangements (Section 6.2).
A number of general observations can be made about the Commission 
proposals.
Firstly, while the IAC implicitly stated Paretian first order 
pricing should be the ultimate objective, this was not recommended 
within the reference time period i.e. up to 1980. Pre-occupation 
with the potential impact on the inflation rate seems to have 
overriden their concern for the allocative distortions occurring 
from sub-market pricing of crude oil products. This might suggest 
an implicit recognition by the Commission of the potential social 
costs of immediate import parity pricing which may outweigh the 
allocative gains. However this trade-off was not explained by the 
IAC, though the beneficiaries of the new scheme, ESSO/BHP, sought 
only a phased-in parity pricing system.
Secondly the IAC appeared to recognise this- the 'free' market 
price, which was so often cited, even lauded in evidence by the 
oil companies, was not the same unambiguous ’free market price* 
economists normally understand. Their recommendation, that the 
*windfall* gains that could be appropriated by domestic oil 
producers, should be the subject of a resources rent tax seems to 
support this contention. At the same time it is not surprising to 
find that the APEA and oil companies accepted the price 
recommendations but not the inferences on rent tax made by the 
Commission.
The government introduced an amended version of the IAC*s 
recommendations as part of the 1977-78 Budget on 16 August 1977. 
The 'Indigenous Crude Oil Policy' as it was formally titled, was 
the Treasurer stated, the first part of an overall statement to be 
made on energy policy. The 'full' policy statement was made in 
November 1977, the last sitting day of Parliament before the 1977 
general Federal elections. This statement omitted any mention of 
the government's stance on taxation of current oil producers.
The actual details of the Indigenous Crude Oil (ICO) Policy and 
the Energy statement are given in the next section. The ICO 
policy stood for one year before it was altered in the 1978-79 
Budget. The changes introduced in August 1978 were ostensibly 
mainly to taxation (levy) arrangements and therein while raising 
consumer prices did not affect producer returns. These changes 
are also reviewed in the next section.
Summary of Pricing Policies
There has not been a consistent approach to energy pricing in 
Australia. While this assertion is unsupported for other 
commodities the evidence is available in relation to the pricing 
of indigenous crude oil.
Governments have varied their pricing criteria, on average every 
few years. Policies have included support prices schemes, aided 
by tariff and compulsory local purchase requirements, sub-market 
*cost plus' arrangements and finally varying attempts to emulate 
'market* prices. There has been the implicit assumption in 
Australia that the supply price of capital in domestic oil 
exploration is prohibitively high. Governments have repeatedly 
sought to subsidise explorers via output prices and or by 
favourable taxation arrangements. However whenever the pricing 
criterion was altered, more often than not taxation policy towards 
the industry was also changed.
For example, when world market prices were emulated by the Gorton 
government after several years of domestic support prices, 
taxation concessions took over the role of channelling incentives 
to the exploration industry. These benefits were altered by the 
Labor government once the industry was offered the incentive of 
world parity for new oil. The latest policy offers this same 
incentive to 'new* and, progressively, for 'old* oil as well as 
concessions which, for offshore producers now probably exceed the 
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The policy was formally announced In November 1977. The
Government saw the need to delineate a policy in the energy area 
because of the essential nature of the commodity and the long term 
uncertainty surrounding the supply of energy in Australia.
The dominant concern throughout the policy statement and the 
earlier announced ICO policy statement was the indigenous crude 
oil supply constraint faced by Australia. The need to improve the 
status of local supply, for reasons of security and as a means of 
attracting investment, permeates most levels of the governments 
initiatives. However the desire for self-sufficiency relates only 
to the area of liquid hydrocarbons as Australia is comparatively 
well endowed with other energy resources. Since 1911, Australia 
has been a net exporter of energy and is one of only four OECD 
nations in this position.(23) It is anticipated that by 1985 
Australia will be one of the larger exporters of energy(24) in the 
world. However while these exports will be mainly coal and 
natural gas (and perhaps uranium), there will still be a need to 
import a growing level of liquid hydrocarbons to fill the domestic 
supply gap.
The desire to obtain self sufficiency in liquid hydrocarbons has 
manifest itself in a number of complementary goals announced in 
the policy statement. The most visible aspect of the general
policy is that relating to the ICO pricing policy since this 
initiative will have the most direct impact on domestic 
consumers. Other aspects include:
(i) conservation — this is to be achieved by consumer 
education and it is asserted in the policy, that by 
increasing energy prices towards world parity there will 
be a depressing effect on consumption as well as 
encouragement of substitution for other energy products.
(ii) encouragement of new energy developments - this is to be 
forstered by measures such as investment incentives, 
export licencing approvals and clarification and 
relaxation of foreign investment guidelines.(25)
(iii) taxation concessions - in 1976-77 Budget there was a
change in the income tax regulations which reintroduced 
‘write off* provisions for mining and petroleum companies 
for income generated from sources other than mining; the 
' 1977-78 Budget allowed a tax rebate of 30 cents in the
dollar for all shareholder monies subscribed to companies 
primarily involved in off-shore exploration.
(iv) approval of certain uranium developments.
(v) increased research and development - the government is 
seeking to increase R & D in energy alternatives by the 
creation and increased funding of the National Energy 
Advisory Committee and associated bodies.
While the items mentioned above are of importance the main
thrust has been placed on the ICO policy on the rationale that 
correct pricing will to a very large extent limit consumption of 
energy and encourage exploration for and development of new energy 
deposits *.(26) The main change in the pricing of ICO policy of 
1975 has been that 'old' oil (existing production) should be 
eli9ifrle for world parity returns although this is to be achieved 
for the producer over a number of stages. Since the Whitlam 
Policy in October 1975, new discoveries and developments had been 
®ii9ikls for full world parity, although under those arrangements 
'new1 oil was to be subject to a production levy of $2 per barrel.
The pricing arrangements were announced in the 1977-78 Budget. 
These formed the basis of what is known as the Indigenous Crude 
Oil Policy (1977) and were as follows:
(a) For all new developments on stream after September 1975 
i.e. *new* oil, producers would receive world parity price 
immediately and would not be subject to any production 
levy.
Existing developments, i.e. 'old’ oil, would be priced as 
follows:- .
(b) Small fields, i.e. those that were producing less than 6 
million barrels a year, would receive world parity.
(c) Large fields, i.e. those that were producing more than 6 
million barrels a year, would receive world parity prices 
for 6 million barrels or 10 per cent of annual production 
(whichever was the greater) in 1977-78. In subsequent 
years the scheduled proportion of output (’parity* 
production) eligible for import parity was set at:
1978- 79 20 per cent of output
1979- 80 35 per cent of output
1980- 81 50 per cent of output
The remaining proportion (i.e. 'non-parity* production) 
would receive the pre-existing price.
(d) The production levy on all existing production, 
irrespective of whether it was ’parity* or 'non-parity' 
production was subject to an increased levy of $3 a barrel 
(up from $2 a barrel).
(e) Although the new arrangement was to extend to 1980-81, the 
Government expressed the intention that producers should
- —  receive full world parity as soon as practicable after 
1980-81.
(f) World parity price level is to be set by the Department of 
National Development every 6 months.
In the 1978-79 Budget, the Government announced further changes in 
the oil pricing policy. As from 17 August 1978 all existing 
production would be priced at the world parity price (then $12.60
a barrel). The production levy of $3.00 a barrel would remain on 
•parity' production as previously stated. However, all existing 
•non-parity’ production would be subject to a higher production 
levy equal to the difference between the world parity price and 
the 'non-parity' base price, e.g. Gippsland crude oil the new levy 
would be equal to $10.26 per barrel i.e. $12.60 minus the 
pre-existing 'non-parity' base price of $2.33.
The arrangements made in the ICOP Statement in 1977, whereby an 
increasing proportion of existing production would attract world 
parity returns for producers, remained unchanged.
The result of these changes is that, while Australian consumers 
are now paying the equivalent of import parity for refined 
products(27), over the next few years there will be a gradual 
change in the distribution of returns to producers from local 
production. Producer returns will rise as the proportion of 
output eligible for world parity, i.e. 'parity* production, 
increases, with the Government's levy receipts declining 
commensurately.
A stylised diagram of the changing pattern of receipts by 
producers and by Government is shown in Figure 2. Estimated 
producers' prices and the net (or implicit net) levy for the years
1978-79 to 1980-81 are shown in Table 2.
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price (of crude oil 
to Australian 
refineries)
$ $ $ $ % % $
25.5.64 2.54 — 2.54 1.60 0.4 99.6 1.60
19.9.65 3.14 - 3.14 1.60 2.5 97.5 1.64
24.4.67 3.16 - 3.16 1.50 2.8 97.2 1.55
27.3.70 2.89 - 2.89 1.39 17.5 . 82.5 1.65
18.9.70 2.06 - 2.06 1.39 52.5 47.5 1.74
18.8.75 2.06 2.00 4.06 7.99 64.0 36.0 5.47
18.9.75 2.37 2.00 4.37 8.49 64.0 36.0 5.85
18.9.76 2.39 2.00 4.39 10.12 63.0 37.0 6.51
18.8.77 3.77 3.00 6.77 11.65 62.0 38.0 8.62
1.1.78 3.75 3,00 . 6.75 11.65 62.0 38.0 8.61
1.7.78 4.54 3.00 7.54 11.10 61.0 39.0 8.95
18.8.78 4.54 8.06* 12.60 11.30 58.0 42.0 12.05
1.1.79
1.7.79 5.50 7.10* 12.60 12.60 56.0 44.0 12.60
1.7.80 6.53 6.07* 12.60 12.60 53.0 47.0 12.60
to 30.6.81_______________________________________________________________________________ _________________
(1) Refers to f.o.b. prices, nearest refinery port., (2) Assumed import parity $12.60 in 1978. Weighted 
average’of the main produces, Moonie, Barrow Island and Gippsland.
* Implicit net levy which takes account of the shift in unit returns between producer and government 
over 1978 to 1981 the period of the ICO policy estimated as at October 1978.
Sources: 1. Australian Institute of Petroleum Ltd (1977) Oil and Australia.
2. Esso Australia (1978) Ltd. Australian Energy Outlook, (1978).
3. Royal Commission on Petroleum, 4th and 5th Reports, 1976.
- 4. Department of National Development, Petroleum Branch, (various publications^.
The opportunity for oil conservation by vi-tue of a simple price 
increase depends on the price elasticity of demand for petroleum 
products. While there may £e scope for substitution by industrial 
users/ in the short run some other users, such as those in 
transportation or those relying on mobile forms of power, will 
have little opportunity to avoid higher petroleum costs by 
substituting other products. Given that 'transportation* accounts 
for over 55 per cent of final petroleum demand, the scope for 
conservation may not be all that large in the short run.
It was suggested at an I AC hearing that giving world parity for 
ICO would increase economically recoverable reserves by an amount 
equal to two years consumption, i.e. 400 million barrels of oil. 
The prospects of increased exploration flowing from an 
announcement of world parity pricing for 'old* oil seems at best a 
tenuous proposition given that *new' oil, i.e. developments made 
after October 1975, have attracted full world parity. The pricing 
of *old' oil would presumably have no bearing on the assessment of 
the viability of any new project and to assert that increasing 
'old' oil prices increases the confidence of the exploring 
companies in government appears to be a rather herioc assumption. 
The maximising of production from existing fields could be better 
achieved by pricing the marginal production at the higher marginal 
price (world parity). Instead under the current arrangements all 
production, not just the marginal, receives an increasing
price.(28)
. The ICO policy statement referred to the possibility of dropping
the production levy and replacing this with a resources rent tax 
♦ (RRT)• This stemmed from a suggestion which was first canvassed 
in the original IAC report. The intention however has since been 
dropped and the levy's continued existence is uncertain for 
producers other than the Bass Strait and Barrow Island. The 
dropping of RRT means that there will be a transfer of income 
within the community from consumers to producers and (via the 
levy, to governments). The levy’s maintenance sits somewhat 
illogically with the Government's desire to increase indigenous 
supply as the existence of the levy may act to reduce the total 
quantity of oil eventually extracted from those fields, e.g. 'Esso 
- maintained that the mere presence of the excise tax in legislation
creates uncertainty and is a considerable deterrent. Esso
»
recommended that this excise tax be abolished except for existing 
crude oil production where it should be phased out(29).
There is perhaps a more peripheral matter of the revenue 
eventually foregone by governments in not implementing an RRT;
• " would lessen the community's claims over the windfall gain 
0 and therefore the Government's ability bo deploy those resources.
What the Government is presuming is that the benefit, ultimately, 
to society, will be greater if these resources remain with the two 
Bass Strait producers rather than be collected and distributed by 
governments. There are a number of cases where this, assumption 
might be refuted to the detriment of Australian society. Also, 
there is no binding agreement on either Esso or BHP that these 
windfall gains be spent on exploration, or developments, which
presumably is one of the central assumption underlying the 
policy. BHP could, rationally, spend the money in its steel 
division or in petroleum exploration in off-shore China, while 
Esso may also move the funds to their highest rate of return 
within the parent company’s organisation. Again there is no 
obligation on either company to invest these windfall gains in 
Australian exploration or even the Australian economy.
While it would be counter productive on efficiency grounds for 
these companies to invest in anything but their most profitable 
outlet, these may still be less than optimal from society’s point 
of view.
V. Relationship Between Crude Oil and 
Refined Retail Prices
There are two bases available to calculate the approximate 
relationship between the cost of crude oil and refined product 
prices. King(30) postulated retail motor spirit prices and crude 
oil prices are related as follows:
Retail Motor Spirit Price = 2.1 (average price of crude oil 
(litres) per litre + 3 cents)
The IAC Working Paper(31) has postulated that for a one dollar 
rise in crude oil prices, retail prices could be expected to 
increase by 6.23 per cent in 1976. Both the IAC and King made a 
number of assumptions which were necessarily of an arbitrary
nature relating to the behaviour of refinery and reseller margins 
and changes in working capital requirements. Thus it is difficult 
to accurately predict the behaviour of refined product prices.
In making estimates complications also arise because refined 
products are produced jointly although their prices can be varied 
individually according to their demand.
In the past the relationship between crude and retail prices has 
been further blurred as a result of factors such as, - discounting 
on retail sales of motor spirit in metropolitan areas - the 
distortions introduced into the price structure of refined 
products as a result of marketing companies trying to maximise 
their ICO allocation under the Oil Absorption Policy.
As can be appreciated from the above discussion its difficult to 
predict the effect on retail prices of a particular change in 
crude oil prices of a particular change in crude oil prices.
~ VI. Extent of Price Increases
The price of crude oil in Australia in July 1978 (i.e. the 
composite supply price(32) was approximately $8.95 a barrel so 
that the increase to world parity in 1978-79 represents an 
increase of 41 per cent in the price of crude paid by Australian
refineries.
On the basis of the relationship postulate^ by the IAC and 
assuming that price increases will be allocated approximately as 
they have in the past, it is estimated that the 1978-79 Budget 
changes will result in the prices of refined white petroleum 
products (aviation, gasolines, motor spirit, power kerosene and 
automotive distillate) rising by approximately 21 per cent. The 
corresponding increase based on King's estimate is 23 per cent. 
These estimates are similar to, but higher than, those price 
increases granted by the Prices Justification Tribunal (PJT) on 7 
September 1978 of 3 cents per litre or 17% for premium motor 
spirit and 2.5 cents per litre or 22% for automotive distillate.
As can be seen from Table 3 the PJT increases are less than those 
that would result from using the Budget estimate. The impact on 
refined product prices was estimated by the Treasurer, in the 
budget statement, as 3.5 cents per litre on motor spirit, or 17 
per cent increase on the maximum Sydney retail price of premium 
motor spirit. Primary producer rates are approximately the 
equivalent of wholesale rates and assuming the increase is 3.5 
cents per litre, across all refined products, the increases in 
capital city (Free Delivery Areas) prices to rural producers would 
range from 20 per cent on motor spirit up to 29 per cent on 
automotive distillate. However, it was claimed that the increases 
allowed by the PJT will not allow a full recovery of costs for the 
oil companies(33), and the matter is to be the subject of a 
further enquiry in November-December 1978 and January 1979.
In the light of the uncertainty surrounding the increase in 
refined product prices granted by the PJT, in particular the 
likelihood of a further increase, the Budget assumption of a 
3.5 cents per litre increase has formed the basis for the 
estimates of the overall effects likely to arise from the move to 
world parity for crude oil prices.
Table 3
ESTIMATED PRICES OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 
AS AT 1 OCTOBER, 1978,
Using : (a) POT Increase Granted on 7 September 1978
(b) Estimated Increases Cited in 1978-79 Budget Papers
Product
(a) Prices Justification 
Tr ibunal
(b) 1978-79 Budget 
Papers
Price Increase Price Increase
c/L % c/L - %
Premium motor spirit 20.23 17.4 20.73 20.0
Regular motor spirit 19.22 18.5 19.72 21.0
Power kerosene 14.31 21.2 15.31 29.0
Automotive distillate 13.95 21.8 14.95 29.0
(duty free)
Note: Prices based on BAE petroleum price series. (2) Prices are 
F.D.A. Capital City (Primary Producer) rates.
VII. Effect of Petroleum Price Changes 
on the Rural Sector
The response of the rural sector to the changes in prices outlined 
above will be governed by the degree to which such changes affect 
farmers* costs of production and methods of farming and whether 
such costs increases can be recouped in the form of higher output
prices.
Price Elasticity* In estimating the response of the sector it 
would be of great assistance if some quantitative assessment could 
be made of individual producer’s response. There are a number of 
factors which complicate such an assessment not least of which is 
the lack of information on rural consumption of petroleum 
products, in a form and over a time period that would allow a 
rigorous analysis to be undertaken. While petroleum consumption 
and production statistics are maintained by various government 
departments and are published by organisations such as the 
Petroleum Institute of Australia, figures are not available on a 
disaggregated basis for the rural sector.
Even if the statistics were available over a lengthy period, the 
analysis would be further complicated by the fact that over the 
past 25 years the retail price of petroleum products has been 
relatively static and any analysis would probably suffer due to 
this factor. Another problem restricting quantitative work is 
that over such a time period there may be variables at work other 
than the price of petroleum which would influence its consumption 
pattern. Such influences could include changes in technology and 
changes in the relative prices of capital and labour.
The assumption that, in the short term at least, the demand for 
petroleum products(34) is price inelastic is useful in examining 
the ’most pessimistic' consequences on rural production of a 
petroleum price increase. The proposition of an inelastic demand 
for petroleum is supported to some extent by empirical estimations 
carried out by an oil company in Australia on the price elasticity
of demand for automotive distillate (the rural community consumes 
20 per cent of total ADO demand). Their results(35) suggest that 
the long run elasticity of demand was equal to 0.2 to 0.3r with 
little variation in consumption occurring until 5 to 7 years after 
the given price increase. A similar study by Folie(36) on the 
demand for motor spirit in the * transportables* area gave 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the short run equal 
to —0.1 and 0.5 in the longer run. Follie’s study divided the end 
users of petroleum products into two basic categories,
* transportables * and another class of users primarily using 
petroleum based products for heat raising functions. The latter 
class of users exhibit a high elasticity with respect to the price 
of substitutes especially natural gas; e.g. gas could replace 
fuel oil in a very large number of industrial cases.
Factors influencing the elasticity of demand include the 
importance of the input in the production process and the 
opportunity available to producers to substitute other factor 
inputs. Most industrial processes require some formal energy 
input and the opportunity for substitution among various sources 
of energy is higher in conurbations than in rural areas. Urban 
based producers have the opportunity to choose from natural gas, 
L.P.G., electricity, coal, fuel oil etc., whereas any producer 
which requires a mobile source of energy is virtually locked into 
some petroleum based energy source. This situation partly has 
arisen because the existing technology and marketing institutions 
developed over a long period of stable and low oil prices. 
Therefore while there may presently be a technically suitable
source of mobile power, there currently exists no arrangements by 
which such fuels can be distributed or assimilated into existing 
production processes (for example LPG could be used in modified 
internal combustion engines).
Consideration of the above would suggest that its not unreasonable 
to expect the short run elasticity to be small and many be close 
to zero, while the long run elasticity is larger, perhaps 
equalling 0.5.
For example, in the long run producers find it profitable to 
substitute items of equipment which may not be as costly to 
operate in petroleum terms. The inelasticity of petroleum in the 
short run demand also related to it being a derived demand; i.e. 
a complementary input used in conjunction with other inputs, the 
symbiosis providing some service in the production process. For 
example, the factor labour may be thought of as having a derived 
demand since it is mostly required for use in conjunction with the 
factor capital, the combination facilitating the production of 
some desired product. Similarly petroleum in rural production is 
required as a necessary adjunct to capital equipment such as 
tractors, headers and generators etc., and together has the 
potential to provide a service to the rural enterprise when other 
factors are included. The service, which could be called 'tractor 
services', is a discreet input into the production process and 
depends upon the efficiency of that input relative to some other 
alternative (for achieving the same result), the relative costs of 
competing inputs determining which input is selected by the
entrepreneur for its inclusion in the production process. In more 
explicit terms, if the cost of 'tractor services' (which includes 
the cost of capital equipment, petroleum, operating costs etc) 
required to produce a given output exceeds the cost of achieving 
the same output by a more intensive use of the factor labour, then 
in terms of efficiency the producer may opt for the latter 
factor. Where the price of labour is rising and that of 'tractor 
services' is declining then conversely a rational producer will 
switch to 'tractor services', which would entail higher purchases 
of capital, petroleum and maintenance services.
While farmers demand petroleum products for use in conjunction 
with certain capital equipment, it is the combined efficiency 
(output to cost ratio) of that service relative to the efficiency 
of some alternative input, which will determine their demand for 
petroleum. The response to increases in fuel costs will therefore 
require an estimation of the response to changes in the price of 
'tractor services' before the question of the demand for petroleum 
products can be approached. In the absence of more detailed 
information the following discussion gives some insight into the 
nature of farmer's demand for petroleum products.
The major cost item, and therefore the variable which is most 
sensitive to the cost (and therein presumably) the demand for the 
input 'tractor services' is the cost of capital equipment itself. 
The cost of powering equipment relative to the current cost would 
be relatively speaking quite small; for the cost of petrol to 
effect the cost of tractor services the increase would have to be
of a considerable magnitude. For example, if petrol represented 
20 per cent of the cost of the ’factor tractor services' (FTS), 
and assuming for a moment that FTS is price inelastic and also 
that petrol will increase by 50 per cent, the increase in the cost 
of FTS would be only 10 per cent. If the petroleum cost increase 
was 25 per cent the increase in FTS would be only 5 per cent; for 
a 100 per cent increase in motor spirit prices FTS would increase 
by 20 per cent, the last being a rather extreme case. For the 
'tail to wag the dog' reaction to occur the demand for tractor 
services would have to be highly price elastic and again it could 
be argued intuitatively, but rationally that such an input (FTS) 
is basically of an essential nature in agriculture as it presently 
lacks a more cost efficient substitute.
The more likely response is that FTS probably has a price 
elasticity somewhere around unity or less than unity, petroleum 
will increase by only 25 per cent as a result of a move toward 
parity and petroleum probably forms less than 20 per cent of the 
cost component of the factor tractor services. Under these 
circumstances, the demand for FTS might decline by 3-5 per cent 
and would therefore have a correspondingly minimal effect on the 
demand for motor spirit.
Given that these examples referred to above, may not be all that 
unrealistic, it does illustrate why rural producer's petroleum 
demand might be price inelastic.
In the Australian economy it is relative input prices that largely 
guide resource use and substitution in the farm enterprise. Over 
the past four years, the rate of increase in fuel prices has been 
204 per cent, whereas the increase in machinery and labour has 
been 194 and 195 per cent. With those, small relative movements 
in input prices, it is not incongruous to expect farm consumption 
of petroleum to remain, at least, at its present levels. An 
increase in the price of fuel, therefore, would be unlikely to 
result in less fuel being used on farms. This in turn would mean 
the full impact of the higher fuel prices would be immediately 
reflected in higher costs for rural producers. The effect of 
these cost increases on producers’ profitability and liquidity is 
dependent upon their ability to pass these costs on in higher 
output prices or adjust their supply. The scope for costs being 
passed on or absorbed by producers involves consideration of a 
number of factors. Basically, there are three possibilities:
(1) farmers cannot pass on cost increases
(2) farmers can pass on fully cost increases
(3) they can partially pass on cost increases.
The degree to which producers can pass on cost increases is 
related to the elasticity of demand for farm products and clearly 
there will not be a universally satisfying answer, as each product 
will probably exhibit its own particular elasticity at any one 
point in time. For example, in a domestic market it could be 
reasonably asserted that cases 2 or 3 might be more realistic. 
Whereas if one makes a small country assumption(37) about
Australia in international trade then the opportunity for passing 
on costs is severely diminished and export oriented rural 
producers might well have to absorb the majority of cost increases.
Table 4
(Average for the three years ending 1976)
Commodity
Aust. Prod.
as % of 
World Prod.
Aust. Trade 
as % of 
World Trade
World Trade 
as % of 
World Prod.
Aust. Trade 
as % of 
Aust. Prod.
Wool(a) 29.2 50.2 46.0 79.1
Beef & Veal 3.6 26.9 5.8 43.7
Butter 2.5 5.1 14.6 29.0
Cheese 0.9 3.9 8.7 36.9
Wheat 3.1 12.3 17.0 68.0
Coarse Grains 0.7 4.3 10.5 59.8
Sugar 3.7 9.9 26.2 69.4
(a) Wool production figures are on a greasy basis and export 
figures refer to virgin wool, so the two are not directly 
comparable.
Source: BAE/ABS Statistical Bulletins (various).
The impact on the world agricultural markets stemming from the 
increased energy costs is quite complex. The world has not 
necessarily faced the same increases in energy costs. While 
ostensibly the EEC has already faced the energy upheaval of the 
early seventies, the group still receives considerable domestic 
protection and subsidies.(38) So long as European currencies
appreciated against the U.S. dollar and most oil contracts 
continue to be denominated in U.S. dollars, the input cost of 
their petroleum is going to be less than that faced by Australian
farmers. The U.S. situation is somewhat different again in that 
while imports supply up to half of their demand which is priced at 
world parity/ the remaining demand is met by local supply prices 
at approximately half the world parity rate; i.e. their composite 
liquid petroleum energy cost is still considerably less than world 
parity. So the assertion that Australia is the last part of the 
world to face world parity pricing is somewhat falacious. While 
some countries have certainly, at the consumer level, faced these 
prices the rural sectors have not necessarily borne these costs.
However given the high export component of Australia’s 
agricultural output it might be appropriate to assume that the 
majority of farmers will not be able to fully pass on cost 
increases. For the majority of farmers the fuel increases will 
have important implications for their profitability, given their 
inability to substitute other lower cost forms of energy.
If the rural sector, for example, exhibits a type of supply 
response which is indifferent to petroleum cost increases, (supply 
curve inelastic with respect to the input cost changes) then the 
brunt of any increase costs will be absorbed by the profit 
margin. The situation may be unlikely, but does serve to 
illustrate how change might be prompted within the sector and 
perhaps between the rural and other sectors. The movement of 
resources from one industry to another, and within industries is 
broadly governed by relative profitabilities. If an industry 
faces a cost which is largely inescapable, then given certain 
conditions in demand for its product, profitability of that
industry will decline and resources could oe expected to flow into 
more profitable pursuits.
For rural industries which can not pass costs on, those that are 
relatively more intensive users of petroleum products, could be 
expected to fare worse than industries that are less intensive 
users and those industries which have the opportunity to 
substitute out of petroleum inputs. Table 5 provides estimates of 
the expected impact on profitability of a number of rural 
industries after taking account of the effect of cost increases 
associated with movement to world parity. The ability of any 
industry to absorb these increases is related to the relative 
importance of petroleum in the cost structure of the industry and 
its long term level of profitability.
It can be seen from the table, certain industries could fare 
reasonably well over the period of adjustment and conversely some 
industries will possibly be worse off. Those industries whose 
profit decline is largest are likely to be those which the 
pressure for contraction are likely to be largest. The industry 
where the profit decline is least may expand relative to the 
others. While the main movement of resources could, initiatively 
be expected to occur in the rural sector this should not preclude 
the possibility that resources may also flow between the rural and
other sectors.
VIII. Impact on Farm Costs
Included is an estimate of the increase in average farm fuel costs 
which are likely to arise as a result of the increase in petroleum 
prices to ’world parity* levels.
The estimates, which have been made for a number of rural 
industries, indicate what additional costs could be expected 
during 1978—79. Calculations have been based on an increase in 
fuel prices of 3.5 cents per litre for motor spirit and an 
equivalent increase for other petroleum products.
In a full year the weighted average increase in fuel costs to all 
rural producers was estimated to be 26 per cent in Free Delivery 
Areas (F.D.A.) of the mainland capital cities. Based on previous 
years utilisation and prices, this could reasonably be expected to 
increase total cash costs of the rural sector by approximately 
$69m or 1.4 per cent in 1978-79.(39)
As shown in Table 5, increases in farm fuel costs for major rural 
industries could rise by between $250 and $858 per farm depending 
on the industry concerned. As might be expected, the biggest 
increases are likely to occur in the cropping industries where 
machinery utilisation tends to be higher than in pastoral 
industries. Overall, it is estimated that higher fuel costs could 
lead to increases in total cash costs per farm of between 1.1 and
2.7 per cent.
The estimates provided in Table 5 refer to the six major rural 
industry groups on an Australia-wide basis. The estimated impact 
of the higher fuel costs on 85 separate categories from thirteen 
classes of rural industry is outlined in Appendix 1. These 
estimates, derived from data from BAE industry survey reports, 
indicate that the increase in average production costs per farm, 
could differ markedly, e.g. from $40 in the 'processing tomatoes' 
industry at Murrumbidgee to $10 067 in the 'cotton growing* 
industry at Namoi (NSW).
While the absolute increase in cash or production costs is 
important, the more important consideration is the relative impact 
of these costs upon farm profitability. This will be influenced 
by the proportion of fuel costs in the total cost structure (i.e. 
the intensity of fuel use in the total production process). 
Producers who use the most petroleum, in volume terms, are not 
necessarily the most intensive petroleum users and, therefore, are 
not the ones whose level of profitability is most adversely 
affected. Obversely those rural producers that are marginal prior 
to the ICO policy introduction could also be expected to fare 
poorly.
Using the latest published survey data on profitability as a proxy 
for long-run profitability, estimates were derived of the impact 
on a number of rural industries of the probable cost increases 
associated with a movement in crude oil prices to world parity.
The 15 most affected industries are ranked in Table 6 according to 
the impact higher fuel costs will have on the existing level of
profitability indexed to 1977-78 levels. Appendix 2 ranks all the 
industries listed in Appendix 1.
As the level of profitability at the last survey was taken as a 
proxy for long term profitability, the ranking in Table 6 must be 
regarded as indicative only. Individual industries* profitability 
will not always be at their long term level at the time of the 
last survey. The use of such a proxy is frought with problems.
One of which is the inability to predict large movements in demand 
curves or changes in productivity. For example the majority of 
the survey data dates from 1974-75 and 76. when the * Index of 
Real Income Per Farm* (IRYPF) was around 89. However due to 
substantial improvements in commodity prices and increases in 
output the Index in 1978-79 is expected to rise to 143. Income 
per farm is expected to increase by 66 per cent over the level of 
1977-78 (when the IRYPF was 86).(40) Thus the increased costs 
associated with higher energy prices may not have the relative 
impact on profitability proffered in Attachment 2.
Table 5
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FUEL COSTS 
ARISING
PER FARM : BEFORE AND 
FROM 1978-79 BUDGET
AFTER COST INCREASES
Item Unit Beef Cropping Sheep Sugar W Horticulture Dairy
Pre-budget
Fuel costs $ 1 128 3 433 1 398 n.a. 1 370 1 000
Total cash costs $ 15 779 30 578 20 489 n.a. 30 415 19 400
Fuel costs % cash % 7.1 11.2 6.8 4 to 8 4.5 5.2
Post-budget
New Fuel costs $ 1 410 4 291 1 747 - 1 712 1 250
Increase $ 282 858 349 623 342 250
Total cash $ 16 061 31 436 20 838 n.a. 30 757 i9 650
Increase in total cash % 1.8 2.7 1.7 - 1.1 1.3
New fuel costs as % of
new total cash costs % 8.8 13.6 8.4 — 5.6 6.4
(1) Based on data supplied by the Queensland Cane Growers1 Council.
Note: Estimated average increase in fuel costs per farm in the year 1978-79. Calculations have been based 
on increase in petroleum prices of 3.5 cents per litre across all white products, i.e. the estimated 
price increases contained in Budget Statement No. 2.
Source: BAE Surveys Canberra (various).
While it can’be seen that certain industries would incur 
significant increases in cash costs, the relative reduction in 
profitability may differ. For the industries shown in Appendix 1, 
the average increase in total cash costs was 2.2 per cent. The 
increases ranged from 0.7 per cent in 'cotton growing' in the Ord 
(W.A.) to 4.9 per cent in the 'Citrus Growing* industry in the Mid 
Murray region (Vic). The average reduction in profitability was 
6.2 per cent, ranging from 1.6 per cent in the 'Processing 
Tomatoes' industry at Bendigo (Vic.) to 71.3 per cent for 'Citrus 
Growing' at Robinvale (Vic.).
Any adjustment resulting from such changes in relative 
profitability would be likely to take the form, initially, of 
changes in the relative sizes of individual rural industries. 
Resources might also flow from the rural to other sectors. It 
should be noted that the data in Tables 5, 6 and 9 refer only to 
the impact on costs resulting directly from fuel price increases 
and take no account of indirect or second round effects on farm 
costs, such as higher transport and fertiliser prices on farm 
costs. These could be expected to increase overall costs and, 
hence, further pressure for adjustment.
IX. Impact on Costs of Other Sectors
While the agricultural sector will undoubtedly be affected by the 
increase in fuel prices, it will not be the only one to bear this 
impost. Fuel is used by all sectors of the economy, each sector’s 
energy consumption bearing an approximately direct relationship to 
its contribution to the economy's total output (see Table 7).
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Table 6
IMPACT OF HIGHER FUEL COSTS ON the relative change in:
(a) profitability,
(b) total cash costs, of various rural industries 













level of cost 
increase
% % $
1. Citrus - Robinvale 6 71.3 2.5 579
2. Beef - Dominant, Pastoral
Zone 55 24.9 1.5 605
3. . Banana - West Australia 25 14.2 4.3 382
4. Tobacco - N.S.W. 83 13.8 2.3 708
5. Banana - South Q'land 22 12.3 3.9 221
6. Winegrape (Swan Valley), W.A. 33 12.1 3.1 403
7. Tobacco - Victoria 84 10.0 3.1 1 106
8. Tobacco - S.W. Q*land . 87 9.9 2.3 607
9. Citrus - Outer
Metro,, N.S.W. 1 9.3 1.7 274
10. Crops - Oriented Pastoral
Zone 60 9.1 2.4 1 159
11. Peanut - Atherton, Qld 38 9.1 4.2 480
12. Dried Vine Fruit (Mid-Murray),
Vic. 14 8.5 2.9 235
13. Sheep - Oriented - High Rain
Zone 72 2.4 1.4 397
14. Tomato Processing - Goulburn 39 2.0 1.8 175
15. Tomato Processing - Bendigo 40 1.1 1.6 63
Source: BAE Surveys (various).
However while most sectors will face short run increases for many 
there exists opportunities for substituting other forms of energy 
(such as electricity, natural gas etc.(41) These options are 
available mainly because most economic activity, other than rural 
pursuits, is concentrated in the conurbations around coastal 
Australia and these areas already carry a substantial 
infrastructure of energy grids or at least are more ameniable to 
their introduction. This option is not readily available to the 
transport or agriculture sectors primarily because of the heavy 
reliance these processes have on mobile power, which in this 
society means the internal combustion or compression engine. Due 
to the considerable size of investments embodying existing 
technology it is likely to be some time before alternatives become 
significant.
The transport sector accounts for approximately one-third of all 
marketed energy consumed in Australia and this is consumed 
entirely in the form of petroleum-based products. Thus the impact 
of fuel price increases could be expected to affect this sector 
more adversely than others. In 1976, the IAC(42) reported on a 
study of the impact of adopting world parity pricing for crude oil 
on a wide cross section of industries' output prices. At that 
time, the price disparity between import parity prices and average 
local crude costs to refiners was 76 per cent. The increase 
resulting from the ICOP changes announced in the 1978-79 Budget 
are approximately 41 per cent. While the actual change in crude 
costs is not of the same order of magnitude, the results obtained 
in the IAC study are not an unrealistic reflection of the likely
effects of the present situation, i.e. tfĉ  ranking would be the 
same. As shown in Table 8, the greatest increase in output 
prices, assuming they are fully passed forward, is in the 
transport (road) industry.
Table 7
ENERGY INTENSITY OF INDUSTRY SECTOR RELATIVE TO 










Agriculture 8.2 2.02 4.1
Mining 3.8 2.86 1.6
Manufacturing 26.6 32.25 28.5
Elect/gas/water 3.4 29.58 4.1
Construction 6.8 0.71
Wholesale/retail 15.0 1.34
Transportation 7.7 26.88 53.8
Service indust 28.5 10.90 7.9
Total 100.0 = 100.0 100.0
Source:. 1. Department Environment, Housing and Community 
Development, Industry Shares of Gross Product, 
Historical Series, Average 1968/69 Prices, January 
1976.
2. Department of National Development, (a) End Use
Analysis of Primary Fuels Forecast 1971-72 to 1984-85 
(Augst 1974). (b) publications (various).
In Table 8, industry groups are ranked according to the size of
the price increase resulting from world parity pricing. As can be
seen, transport is the most adversely affected. Of the remainder,
9 industry classes are agricultural (that is all the agricultural
industries) and a further four industries are agricultural in
orientation, using agricultural produce directly in their
processes. This demonstrates the vulnerability of the rural
sector to petroleum price increases. The IAC calculations have 
allowed for second round effects and inciuia indirect effects such 
as the influence petroleum prices have on transport * fertilisers 
and other purchases inputs and, therefore, on agriculture.
Freight Subsidy Scheme ; State Grants (Petroleum 
Products) Amendment Bill 1978
This freight equalisation scheme has been introduced in an attempt 
to partially offset the price differentials existing between city 
and country. The scheme is aimed at reducing the price paid by 
all country consumers of certain light petroleum products by means 
of a subsidy on transport costs incurred from refinery/seaboard 
terminal to country sale points. The products eligible are motor 
spirit, power kerosene, avgas and automative distillate.
The Act will for all intents and purposes reinstate the 1965 
Federal Act which the Commonwealth shelved in 1974 after the 
Report by the Combs Task Force on Federal Expenditure alleged that 
the main beneficiaries were users in inland cities such as 
Toowoomba, Canberra and Broken Hill and large raining and pastoral 
companies, rather than rural producers. It operates via section 
96 of the Constitution and has required restoration of 
complementary State legislation. The scheme commenced nationally 
on the 1 July 1978 with an initial appropriation in the 1978-79 
Budget of $50 million.
Table 8
EFFECT OF WORLD PARITY PRICING FOR INDIGENOUS 
CRUDE OIL ON OUTPUT PRICES FOR TWENTY 
INDUSTRIES MOST AFFECTED(a)





1 Road transport 7.32
2 Fishing, trapping and hunting 5.36 1
3 Cereal grains 4.75 2
4 Iron 4.15
5 Milk cattle and pigs 3.08 3
6 Forestry and logging 2.94 4
6 Meat cattle 2.94 4
8 Four mill and cereal food 2.84 *
9 Services to mining 2.66
9 Air transport 2.66
11 Sheep 2.61 6
11 Other farming 2.61 7
13 Milk products 2.56 *
14 Meat products 2.38 *
15 Prepared fibres 2.24
15 Services to agriculture 2.24 8
17 Ready-mixed concrete 2.14
18 Food products 2.05 *
19 Paints, varnishes 1.96
20 Poultry 1.86 9
(a) Excluding Petroleum industries.
Sources: IAC, Inter-Industry Analysis of a Crude Oil Price
Increase, September 1976.
Note : 1 Calculations based on (1) input-output bases 1968-69.
(ii) Import parity price of $10 .77 a barrel (implicitly
an increase of $4.66 a barrel or 76 per cent . (iii)
allowances made for second round effects.
Note : 2 Price change resulting from the 1978-79 ICO arrangements
was $3.65 or 41 per cent increase a barrel. Although the
rankings would remain the same the price effects could be
expected to be proportionately lower.
The program involves the subsidisation of country freight costs to 
the extent that inland consumers pay no more than 0.88 cents per 
litre (4 cents per gallon) for the freight component of fuel
costs, any freight cost in excess of this .amount (i.e. 0.88 cents 
per litre) will be met by the Commonwealth. Conversely where the 
explicit freight costs amount to less than 0.88 cents per litre 
the scheme will have no impact on the retail prices. Large 
country towns within the 'free delivery areas' of capital cities 
or those cities/towns that are bulk sea terminals will receive no 
assistance with this freight subsidy. The cost of petroleum at 
those major ports is uniform with most capital cities, the freight 
component for these centres being built into the capital city 
price structure.
The Commonwealth government has gazetted the names of 10 000 
locations throughout Australia and the level of subsidy which is 
approximately payable for deliveries to that point of sale. The 
distribution of the rate of subsidy and the number of locations 
involved is shown in the following table:
Relative distribution Locations (No's) Subsidy (cents per litre)
48% 4800 0
20% 2000 0.1 to 0.9
30% 3000 greater than 1.0
Source: Hansard (various) 1978.
The actual subsidy paid to the courier will depend on costs 
submitted to and approved by the Prices Justification Tribunal 
from time to time. Part of the Act also requires that 'approved'
couriers sign an agreement specifying that they will pass on the 
full benefit of the subsidy paid by the Commonwealth to the end 
consumer.
The net benefit rural producers can expect from this initiative is 
difficult to assess. There is no estimate available for inland 
fuel sales outside the Free Delivery Areas? the Petroleum 
Institute of Australia's estimate of rural producers consumption 
of qualifying products amounted to $512 mil when indexed forward 
to 1977-78 cost levels. If all the allocated funds (i.e. $50 
million in 1978-79) were payable solely to primary producers the 
reduction in costs would amount to approximately 10 per cent, 
however the scheme covers sales to all classes of petroleum 
consumers at eligible locations including retail, industrial 
(most), mining concerns as well as rural producers.
Using another method however, it has been estimated that the 
operation of this scheme will bring about a weighted average 
reduction of 0.5 cents per litre in the price of fuel to rural 
producers in the wheat belt districts of mainland Australia.(43) 
This, in turn, would reduce the increase in fuel prices, stemming 
from the 1978-79 Budget, from the estimated 26.0 per cent as shown 
in Table 6, to 20.5 per cent. The implied 'reduction* in average 
fuel costs per farm by major rural industry is shown in Table 9. 




ESTIMATED INCREASES IN AVERAGE FUEL COSTS PER FARM : ADJUSTED 
FOR EFFECTS OF FREIGHT SUBSIDY SCHEME
Item Unit Beef Cropping Sheep Sugar(2) Horticulture Dairy
Post-budget
Initial increase in
fuel costs $ 282 858 349 623 342 250
Reduction due to F.S.S. $ 51 154 62 108 61 45
Net increase in fuel
cost $ 231 704 286 515 280 205
New fuel costs $ 1359 4137 1684 — 1650 1205
(a) Based on data supplied by the Queensland Cane Grower's Council. (b) Estimated average increase in fuel 
costs per farm in a full year. (c) These estimates do not take account of the effect of the subsidy 
prior to 1978-79 Budget increases in fuel prices.
The net benefit of the scheme to primary producers in aggregate is 
estimated to be approximately $15m. On this basis, the Freight 
Subsidy Scheme could reduce the increase in fuel costs in 1978-79 
from $69m to $54m. .
XI. Postscript
iS December 1978 the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries announced that crude oil prices would be increased by 
14.5 per cent in 1979. Prices were lifted by 5 per cent on the 1 
January 1979, the balance in equal installments over the next 
three quarters. In line with the half yearly price reviews of the 
import parity level for crude oil, the Department of National 
Development lifted the price of Australian crudes from A$12.62 to 
A$13.66 per barrel. This represents a 9.5 per cent increase in 
price. Half the increase was attributable to OPEC increases, the 
balance was due to changes in the exchange rate, freight rate, and 
increases in the value of the quality differential over the six 
months to 1 January 1979. Table 10 includes the estimated new 
prices for crude oil facing Australian refineries.
On the basis of calculations made in Section VII, these new 
increases will increase aggregate costs in the rural sector by 7 
million for the remainder of 1978-79.
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$ $ $ $ (per cent) $
18/8/78 4.54 8.06** 12.60 11.30 58 42 12.05
1/1/79 13.66 11.77 58 42 12.86
1/7/79 14.50 12.51 56 44 13.62
1/1/80 14.92 12.88 56 44 14.02
1/7/80 14.92 12.88 53 47 14.02
to
30/6/81
* Adjusted for OPEC price increases announced 18 December 1978 and assuming no further increases until after
June 1981 •
** Implicit ’net* levy which takes account of the shift in unit returns between producer and government over
1978-81 period.




The implementation of, and subsequent changes to, the Indigenous 
Crude Oil Policy are expected to have a major impact upon fuel 
costs in Australia. The major policy initiative was the partial 
introduction of world parity pricing in the 1977-78 budget and its 
full implementation in the 1978-79 budget through the imposition 
of higher levies on some of the domestically produced crude.
Under the assumption that the increase in petroleum (refined) 
products, stemming from the 1978-79 Budget, would be approximately 
3.5 cents per litre, the aggregate weighted average increase in 
the rural sector's fuel costs was estimated to be 26 per cent. To 
the extent that the rural sector can not avoid such increases or 
pass them on to consumers through higher output prices, this 
impost will be reflected in the short run in lower profitability.
This increase in costs is not one which the rural sector faces in 
isolation as every other sector in the economy will also be 
affected. However, it would appear from the data surveyed that 
the rural sector will probably be among the most adversely 
affected groups. Even when account is taken of supportive 
measures such as the freight subsidisation scheme it is estimated 
that the rural sector will face additional costs of $54m or 1.1 
per cent increase in total costs in a full year as a result of the 
changes in the oil policy. In the short run, the changes in the 
oil policy are estimated to result in an increase in average fuel 
costs of rural producers ranging from $250 to $858. The long-run
effects are hard to isolate owing to the indirect effects of the 
cost changes on the country's overall industrial structure and 
international trading situation.(44)
Given the difficulties which producers often face with respect to 
passing on costs, the increased prices resulting from the change 
in the oil policy are likely to add further pressures for change 
in rural industries.
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the pricing of these products will probably inhibit one rate 
of increase in their prices e.g. electricity is supplied by 
State government instrumentalities which seems to price 
output on marginal cost basis rather than some 'opportunity*
cost basis.
(42).IAC op.cit.
(43) These calculations were made on the basis of a confidential 
survey of petroleum prices applying in a number of centres 
within the wheat zones of the mainland States. This 
estimate, therefore, implicitly assumes that these prices are 
representative of oil petroleum prices faced by the majority 
of inland primary producers.
(44) A number of papers presented at a recent seminar on 'Oil and 
Australia's Future', (Australian Institute of Political 
Science Summer School, Canberra 28 January 1979, e.g. see 
Dixon, G.L.R.) explicitly assumed the coming oil 'crisis* in 
Australia would lead to substantial devaluations of the 
Australian dollar.
While ostensibly it may be thought such changes may aid 
agriculture, given the institutions and market conditions in 
Australia, these currency movements might possibly feed
into the price level. This increase in the domestic 
inflation rate may well negate any returns in favour of 
exporting or import substitution industries normally thought 
to be associated with devaluation.
However I don't consider that a devaluation, stemming solely 
from our growing need for oil imports, is a foregone 
conclusion in the light of Mr. Wood's comments on energy 
exports in the coming years.
Appendix No. 1
IMPACT OP HIGH PETROLEUM PRICES ON 
AVERAGE FUEL EXPENDITURE PER FARM IN VARIOUS 
AUSTRALIAN RURAL INDUSTRIES
(Index of Tables)
Table Number Survey Title Survey Date
1. Horticultural Survey (Citrus Fruits) 1974/5
2. Dried Vine Fruits Industry 1967/8
3. Ginger Growing Industry 1966/7
4. Banana Industry Survey 1961/2
S. Wine Grape Industry 1967/8
6. Deciduous Canning Fruit Growing Industry 1968/9
7. Peanut Industry 1967/8
8. Processing Tomato Growing Industry 1968/9
9. Cotton Growing Industry 1966/7
10. Wheat Industry 1975/6
11. Dairy Industry Survey 1973/4
12. Australian Grazing Survey Industries by
Enterprise Type and Zone 1975/6
13. Tobacco Growing Industry 1972/3
*NB: All survey data has been indexed forward to 1977/8 price
levels. Indexing procedures are available from the author.
** Assuming a weighted average increase of 26 per cent in rural 



































Total cash costs $ 16 133 15 631 36 903 59 772 22 871 29 774 22 475 6091 26 584 41 743 29 142
Total costs $ 21 551 24 978 42 775 69 626 29 833 36 741 34 171 8837 34 969 50 808 37 001
Net farm income $ 2 947 13 067 10 646 16 157 8 760 4 720 812 8538 3 557 15 689 9 777
Fuel $ 1 096 1 474 1 632 2 822 1 415 1 323 2 317 1249 1 648 1 508 1 488
% T.C.C. 6.8 9.4 4.4 4.7 6.2 4.5 10.3 20.5 6.2 3.6 5.1
% T.C. 5.1 5.9 3.8 4.1 4.8 3.6 6.8 14.1 4.7 3.0 4.0
Increase in fuel 
costs $ 274 368 408 705 353 330 579 312 412 377 372
New fuel costs $ 1 370 1 842 2 040 3 527 1 768 1 653 2 896 1 561 2 060 1 885 1 860
% increase in T.C .C. 1.7 2.3 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.1 2.5 4.9 1.5 0.9 1.3
% increase in T.C • 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.7 3.4 1.2 0.7 1.0
Percentage reduction 
in net profit 9.3 2.8 3.8 4.4 4.0 7.0 71.3 3.7 11.6 2.4 3.8
Table 2%














TotalSpecialists N.S.W. Vic. Total N.S.W. Vic. Total vale
Total cash costs $ 10 430 10 673 10 415 10 459 6613 7782 7444 9746 9905 10 099 9534
Total costs $
Net farm income $ 6 650 5 884 6 135 6 094 1851 2756 2494 6687 5121 5 894 6226
Fuel $ 856 838 840 840 958 942 948 811 861 848 845
% T.C.C. 8.2 7.9 8.1 8.1 14.5 12.1 12.7 8.3 8.7 8.4 8.9
% T.C.
Increase in fuel 
costs $ 214 209 210 210 239 235 237 202 215 212 211
New fuel costs $ 1 070 1 047 1 050 1 050 1 197 1177 1185 1013 1076 1 060 1056
% increase in T.C .C. 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 3.5 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2
% increase in T.C •
% reduction in 




Total cash costs $ 7 802
Total costs $ 14 739




Increase in fuel costs $ 148
New fuel costs $ 740
% increase in T.C.C. 1.9




THE AUSTRALIAN BANANA INDUSTRY
QLD NSW
(20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Far Nth Sth Nth Sy
Nth Qia Qld NSW NSW
Total cash costs $ 5132 4532 5503 3961 6197
Total costs $
Net farm income $ 2372 3188 1796 2060 2424
Fuel $ 787 543 887 337 681
% T.C.C. 15.3 12.0 16.1 8.5 11.0
% T.C.
Increase in fuel
costs $ 196 135 221 84 170
New fuel costs $ 983 678 1108 421 851
% increase in T.C.C. 3.7 2.9 3.9 2.1 2.7
% increase in T.C.
Percentage reduction
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Total Cash Costs $ 24 862 24 554 23 815 23 368 19 824 12 549 11 877 12 628
Total Costs $ 53 610 52 593 51 474 45 723 42 671 35 760 35 512 43 602
Net Income $ 14 525 11 993 10 745 11 472 8 493 6 897 8 134 3 338
Fuel $ 2 279 1 781 1 547 2 239 1 335 1 437 1 080 1 613
% T.C.C. VO ♦ to 7.3 6.5 9.6 6.7 11.5 9.1 12.0
% T.C. 4.3 3.3 3.0 4.9 3.1 4.0 3.1 3.7
Increase in Fuel 
Costs $ 569 445 386 559 333 359 270 403
New Fuel Costs $ 2 848 2 226 1 933 2 798 1 668 1 796 1 350 3 741
% Increase in T.C.C. 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.7 to . CO 2.2 3.1
% Increase in T.C. 1.1 o • CD 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.0 CO•o 0.9
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Income 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.9 3.9 5.2 3.3 12.1
Table 6







Total cash costs $ 20 952 10 083 11 793 15 086
Total costs $ 26 340 15 437 15 774 20 075
Net income $ 7 683 5 217 3 239 5 710
Fuel $ 1 184 987 778 1 013
% T.C.C. 5.7 9.8 6.6 6.7
% T.C. 4.5 6.4 4.9 5.1
Increase in fuel
costs $ 296 246 194 253
New fuel costs $ 1 480 2 713 972 1 266
% increase in T.C.C. 1.4 2.4 1.6 1.7
% increase in T.C. 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.3
Percentage reduction
in net income 3.9 4.7 6.0 4.4
Table 7
PEANUT INDUSTRY
Kingaroy Atherton State Qld
Total Cash Costs $ 18 816 10 993 17 823
Total Costs $
Net Income $ 13 830 5 298 12 747
Fuel $ 2 584 1 921 2 498
% T.C.C. 13.7 17.5 14.0
% T.C. •
Increase in Fuel Costs $ 646 480 624
New Fuel Costs $ 3 230 2 401 3 122
Increase in T.C.C. % 3.3 4.2 3.4
Increase in T.C. %
Percentage Reduction in
Net Income 4.7 9.1 4.9
Table 8
PROCESSING TOMATO GROWING INDUSTRY
Goulburn
Rochester Bendigo Murrumbidgee
Total Cash Costs $ 9 726 3 880 1 785
Total Costs $ 29 964 5 857 2 701
Net Income $ 8 671 6 013 611
Fuel $ 703 253 161
% T.C.C. 7.2 6.5 9.0
% T.C. 2.4 4.3 6.0
Increase in Fuel Costs $ 175 63 40
New Fuel Costs $ 878 316 201
% Increase in T.C.C. 1.8 1.6 2.2
% Increase in T.C. 0.6 1.0 1.5
Percentage Reduction in
Net Income 2.0 1.1 6.6
Table 9
THE AUSTRALIAN COTTON GROWING INDUSTRY
N.S.W. Qld W.A.
Mia Namoi Sth. Central Rain Ord
Total Cash Costs $ 134 336 468 987 171 456 91 683 34 807 445 930
Total Costs $ 231 959 668 474 261 490 141 493 76 776 535 996
Net Income $ 72 649 197 995 75 063 69 876 38 858 91 988
Fuel $ 14 911 40 270 20 106 8 956 4 723 12 463
% T.C.C. 11.1 8.6 11.7 9.8 13.6 2.8
% T.C. 6.4 6.0 7.7 6.3 6.2 2.3
Increase in Fuel 
Costs $ 3 727 10 067 5 026 2 239 1 180 3 115
New Fuel Costs $ 18 638 50 337 25 132 11 195 5 903 15 578
% Increase in 
T.C.C. 2.7 2.1 2.9 2.4 3.3 0.7
% Increase in T.C. 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.5 0.6
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Profit 5.1 5.1 6.7 3.2 3.0 3.4
Table 10
WHEAT SURVEY
Qld N.S.W. Vic. S.A. W. A. Aust.
Total Cash Costs $ 26 334 24 259 18 159 17 176 38 075 24 698
Total Costs $ 63 371 68 603 62 760 56 843 94 514 70 054
Net Farm Income
Fuel $ 4 108 2 836 2 699 2 185 4 289 3 043
% T.C.C. 15.6 11.7 14.9 12.3 11.3 12.3
% T.C. 6.5 4.1 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.4
Increase in Fuel
Costs $ 1 027 709 674 546 1 072 760
New Fuel Costs $ 5 135 3 545 3 373 2 731 5 361 3 803
% Increase in T.C.C. 3.8 2.9 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.0
% Increase in T.C. 1.6 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Profit
Calculation for profit in the various states were not 
calculated. Given the recent recovery in grain producers 
profitability its unlikely these cost increases would leave 




AUSTRALIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY SURVEY
(48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54)
N.S.W. Vic. Qld S,A. W.A, Tas. Aust.
Total Cash Costs $ 9 932 9 768 8 226 8 648 18 280 11 803 9 917
Total Costs $ 17 606 15 708 13 509 13 960 24 757 17 971 15 644
Net Farm Income $ 6 595 9 249 3 724 7 464 12 823 6 040 7 661
Fuel $ 847 982 892 1 145 1 770 1 124 986
% of T.C.C. 8.5 10.1 10.8 13.2 9.7 9.5 9.9
% of T.C. 4.8 6.3 6,6 8,2 7,1 6.3 6.3
Increase Fuel 
Costs $ 211 245 223 286 442 281 246
New Fuel Costs $ 1058 1 227 1 115 1 431 2 212 1 405 1 232
% Increase in T.C.C. 2,1 2.4 2.6 3.2 2,4 2,3 ' 2.4
% Increase in T.C. 1.2 1.5 1,6 2,0 1,8 1.5 1.5
Percentage Reduction in 
Net Profit 3.2 2.6 6,0 3,8 3,4 4,7 3.2
Table 12
AUSTRALIAN GRAZING INDUSTRY SURVEY


















Total Cash Costs $ 39 835 38 597 44 505 40 594 34 583 47 821 60 821 42 654
Total Costs $ 
Net Farm Income 9246 14 702 9803 14 263 27 747 12 752 23 443 12 474
Fuel $ 2423 2552 2481 2012 4410 4636 3753 2794
% T.C.C. 
% T.C. 6.1 6.6 5.6 5.0 12.8 9.7 6.3 6.6
Increased Fuel Costs $ 605 638 620 503 1102 1159 938 698
New Fuel Costs 3028 3190 3101 2515 5512 5795 4691 3492
Increase in T.C.C. 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2 3.1 2.4 1.5 1.6
% Increase in T.C. 
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Profit 24.9 4.3 6.3 3.5 4.0 9.1 4.0 5.6
Wheat/Sheep: (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68)
Total Cash Costs $ 14 682 27 453 17 967 22 839 30 400 26 911 36 935 27 204
Total Cost $
Net Farm Income $ 7325 7916 5646 14 560 18 950 17 497 16 385 15 122
Fuel $ 1340 2333 1037 1893 3328 2629 2790 2491
% T.C.C. 9.1 8.5 5.8 8.3 11.0 9.8 7.6 9.2
% T.C.
Increased Fuel Costs 335 583 259 473 832 657 697 622
New Fuel Costs 1675 2916 1296 2366 4160 3286 3487 3113
% Increase in T.C.C. 2.2 2.1 1.4 2.0 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.2
% Increase in T.C. 
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Profit 4.6 7.4 4.6 3.3 4.4 3.8 4.3 4.1
* (Continued on next page)
Table 12 (continued)
Zone















Total Cash Costs $ 13 296 28 590 13 469 28 193 40 513 11 289 20 836 17 752
Total Costs $
Net Farm Income $ 5 003 11 865 8 077 16 724 27 338 6 581 8 556 8 018
Fuel $ 946 1 756 1 129 1 588 4 340 934 1 252 1 178
% T.C.C. 7.1 6.2 8.4 5.6 10.7 8.3 6.0 6.6
% T.C.
Increased Fuel Costs $ 236 439 282 397 1 085 233 313 294
New Fuel Costs $ 1 182 2 195 1 411 1 985 5 425 1 167 1 565 1 472
% Increase in T.C.C. 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.4 2.6 2.0 1.5 1.6
% Increase in T.C.
Percentage Reduction
in Net Profit 4.7 3*7 3.5 2.4 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.7
All Zones: (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82)
Total Cash Costs $ 15 779 28 775 20 489 26 862 30 577 27 335 30 339 23 823
Total Costs $
Net Farm Income $ 5 563 10 629 7 901 15 441 19 318 16 469 13 026 11 370
Fuel $ 1 569 2 213 1 549 1 831 4 026 2 733 2 598 2 154
% T.C.C. 9.9 7.7 7.6 6.8 13.2 10.0 8.6 9.1
% T.C.
Increased Fuel Costs $ 392 553 387 457 1 006 683 649 538
New Fuel Costs $ 1 961 2 766 1 936 2 288 5 032 3 416 3 247 2 692
% Increase in T.C.C. 2.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 3.2 2.4 2.1 2.2
% Increase in T.C.
Percentage Reduction
in N£w Profit 7.1 5.2 4.9 3.0 5.2 4.2 5.0 4.7
*
AUSTRALIAN TOBACCO GROWING INDUSTRY
. Table 13
(83) (84) (85) (86) (87)
N.S.W. Vic. Q. Nth Q. Sth Q. S-W State Aust.
Total Cash Costs $ 29 559 35 048 28 103 19 548 25 738 26 220 29 310
Total Costs $ 36 Oil 43 997 34 716 25 986 32 470 32 803 36 629
Net Income $ 5 144 11 047 10 350 8 229 6 154 9 670 9 669
Fuel $ 2 835 4 427 2 259 2 254 2 431 2 268 3 002
% T.C.C. 9.6 12.6 8.0 11.5 9.5 8.7 10.2
% T.C. 7.9 10.1 6.5 8.7 7.2 6.9 8.2
Increase in Fuel $ 708 1 106 564 563 607 567 750
New Fuel 3 543 5 533 2 823 2 817 3 038 2 835 3 752
% Increase in T.C.C. 2.3 3.1 1.9 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.5
% Increase in T.C. 1.9 2.5 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.0
Percentage Reduction 
in Net Profit 13.8 10.0 5.5 6.9 9.9 5.9 7.8
Appendix No, 2
‘ IMPACT OF HIGHER FUEL COSTS ON 
VARIOUS RURAL INDUSTRIES'
(a) profitability
(b) total cash costs;
(ranked in order or impact on profitability)















2. Beef - Dominant, 
Pastoral Zone 55 24.9 1.5 605
3. Banana - West Aust. 25 14.2 4,3 382
4. Tobacco - N.S.W. 83 13.8 2.3 708
5. Banana - Sth Q'land 22 12.3 3,9 221
6. Winegrape (Swan 
Valley), W.A. 33 12,1 3,1 403
7. Tobacco - Victoria 84 10,0 3.1 1 106
8. Tobacco - S.W. 
Q ’land 87 9.9 2,3 607
9. Citrus - Outer 
Metro., N.S.W, 1 9,3 1,7 274
10. Crops - Oriented 
Pastoral Zone 60 9,1 2.4 1 159
10. Peanut - Atherton, Q, 38 9,1 4,2 480
12. Dried Vine Fruit 
(Mid-Murray) , Vic, JL4 8,5 2,9 235
13. Banana - Far North, Q. 20 8,3 3,7 196
14. Beef - Oriented, 
Wheat/Sheep Zone 63 7,4 2,1 583
15. Beef - Dominant, 
All Zones 78 7,1 2.4 392
16. Citrus - Sunraysia, V. 5 7,0 1.1 330
16. Banana - Sth N.S.W. 24 7.0 2.7 170
. 18. Tobacco - Sth Q 'land 86 6.9 2.8 563
19. Cotton - Sth N.S.W. 44 6,7 2.9 5 026
20.
21.
Tomato Processing - 
Murrumbidgee 
Sheep Dominant - 
Pastoral Zone
41
57 6.3 1.4 620
22. Dairy - Queensland 50 6.0 2.6 223
22. Deciduous Canning 
Fruit, RMIA Vic. 36 6.0 1.6 194
24. Tobacco - Nth Q 'land 35 5.5 1.9 564
25. Beef - Oriented, All 
Zones 77 5.2 1.9 553
25. Crops - Dominant - 
All Zones 80 5.2 3.2 1 006
25. Wine Grapes - Barossa 
Valley 31 5.2 2.8 359
28. Cotton - MIA - NSW 42 5.1 2.7 3 727
28. Cotton - Namoi - NSW 43 5.1 2.1 10 067
(Continued on next page)
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■, % % %30. AGIS - Mixed - All
Zones 82 5.0 2.1 64931. Sheep - Dominant -
All Zones 78 4.9 1.9 38731. Winegrape - Swan Hill
Vic. 29 4.9 2.3 55933. Deciduous Canning
Fruit, MIA 35 4.7 2.4 24633„ Peanut - Atherton
Q ?land 4.7 3.3 646
33. Beef - Dominant -
High Rainfall Zone 4.7 1.8 236
33. Dairy - Tasmania 53 4.7 2.3 281
37. Sheep - Dominant -
Wheat/Sheep Zone 64 4.6 1.4 259
38. AGIS - Mixed -
Pastoral Zone 61 4.5 2,2 335
39. Citrus - Mid-Murray
(NSW) 4 4.4 1.2 705
39. Crops - Dominant -
Wheat/Sheep Zone 66 4.4 2,7 832
41. Beef - Oriented -
Pastoral Zone 56 4.3 1,6 638
41. AGIS - Mixed -
Wheat/Sheep Zone 68 4.3 1,9 697
43. Dried Vine Fruit -
All N.S.W. 16 4,2 2.1 215
43. Banana - Nrth Q ’land 21 4.2 2,9 JL35
43. Crops - Oriented -
All Zones 81 4.2 2,4 683
46. Banana - North NSW 23 4.1 2.1 84
47. Crops - Dominant -
Pastoral Zone 59 4.0 3.1 1 102
47. AGIS - Mixed -
Pastoral Zone 61 4.0 1.5 938
47. Crops - Dominant -
High Rainfall Zone 73 4.0 2.6 1 085
50. Winegrapes - MIA (NSW) 26 3.9 2.2 569
50. Winegrapes - Upper -
Murray, Vic. 30 3.9 1.7 333
50. Deciduous Canning
Fruit - Goulburn, NSW 3.9 1.4 296
53. Citrus - Sunraysia,
NSW 3 3.8 1.1 408
53. Citrus - All Australian
Average 9 3.8 1.3 372
53. Dairy - South Aust. 3.8 3,2 286
53. Crops - Oriented -
Wheat/Sheep Zone 67 3.8 2.4 657
57. Citrus - Mid Murray,
Vic. 7 3.7 4,9 312
57. Winegrape - Daretvilie 27 3.7 1.8 445
(Continued on next page)
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57. Beef - Oriented -
High Rainfall Zone 70 3.7 1.5 439
57. AGIS - Mixed - High
Rainfall Zone 3.7 1.5 313
61. Dried Vine Fruit -
NSW 11 3.6 1.9 209
61. Dried Vine Fruit - All
Victoria 13 3,6 2.1 212
61. Wine Grape - Mildura 3.6 1.6 386
64. Crops - Oriented -
High Rainfall Zone 74 3.5 2.0 233
64. Sheep - Dominant -
High Rainfall Zone 71 3.5 2.1 282
*64. Sheep Oriented -
Pastoral Zone 58 3.5 1.2 503
67. Dairy - West Aust. 3.4 2.4 442
67. Cotton - Ord - West
Aust. 47 3.4 0.7 3 115
67. Dried Vine Fruit -
All Industry Average 3.4 2.2 211
67. Dried Vine Fruit -
Sunraysia, Vic. 12 3.4 2.0 210
70. Sheep - Oriented -
Wheat/Sheep Zone 65 3.3 2.0 473
70. Winegrape Industry -
Adelaide 32 3.3 2.2 270
72. Dairy - All Australian
Average 34 3.2 2.4 246
72. Dairy - NSW 48 3.2 2.1 211
72. Cotton - Central Qld 45 3.2 2.4 2 239
72. Dried Vine Fruit -
Sunraysia Specialists 10 3.2 2.0 214
76. Sheep - Oriented -
All Zones 79 3.0 1.7 457
76. Cotton - Rain Dist.
Queensland 46 3.0 3.3 1 180
76. Dried Vine Fruit -
Robinvale 15 3.0 2,0 202
79. Dried Vine Fruit - NSW 13 2.9 3,5 239
80. Citrus - MIA - NSW 2 2.8 2.3 368
81. Dairy - Victoria 49 2.6 2.4 245
82. Citrus ~ South Aust. 8 2.4 0,9 377
82. Sheep - Oriented -
High Rain Zone 72 2.4 1.4 397
84. Tomato Processing -
Goulburn 39 2.0 1.8 175
85. Tomato Processing -
Bendigo 40 1.1 1.6 63
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDUS! IES CITED 
. IN APPENDIX 1 AND 2
1. Absolute Increases in Farm Costs
($) Range No. .
0 ' - 200 8
200 - 400 39
400 - 600 19
600 - 800 12
800 - 1 000 2
1000 - 1 200 6
1200 - 3 200 3
3200 - 10 200 2





0 - 0.5 0 0
0.5 - 1.0 2 0
1.0 - 1,5 8 1
1.5 - 2,0 21 0
2.0 - 2.5 34 4
2.5 - 3.0 13 3
3.0 - 3.5 9 12
3.5 - 4.0 3 17
4.0 . - 4.5 2 13
4.5 - 5.0 1 10
5.0 - 6.0 9
6.0 - 7.0 6
7.0 - 8.0 5
8.0 - 9.0 2
9.0 - 10.0 4
10.0 - 25.0 5
25.0 . - 50.0 1
50.0 - 75.0 1
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